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Maryland v Craig:
Closed Circuit Television, Child Abuse,
and the Confrontation Clause
Jennifer A. Seegmiller

Introduction
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution
very simply guarantees the right of the accused to be
confronted with the witness against him. However, in the last
two-hundred years, some acceptable exceptions have arisen.
Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled that in light of a
compelling state interest, the accused right to confrontation can
be denied.
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Craig
that the right to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth
amendment is only a "preference" and this right can be
discounted because of an important State interest. The
important issue identified by the Court was the State's interest
to protect the physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims. Because this policy was deemed sufficiently
important the child was allowed to testify outside of the
courtroom via closed-circuit television.
In October of 1986, a Maryland grand jury charged Sandra
Ann Craig, the owner and operator of a preschool, with child
abuse, first- and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual
practice and assault and battery. The alleged victim was Brooke
Etze, who attended the preschool between August 1984 and
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June 1986, when she was between four and six years of age
(Pershkov 935). 1
Brooke's parents initially read about the complaint of child
abuse at Craig's school in a newspaper. Subsequently, they
received a letter inviting them to a meeting with the county's
sexual assault center and the social services and health
departments to discuss the problem. After this meeting, the
Etzes arranged for a therapist to evaluate their daughter.
During the fourth session, Brooke told the therapist of several
incidents of physical as well as psychological abuse. The abuse
included kicking Brooke on the legs and in her "private parts,"
inserting a stick in her vagina, sticking her with thumbtacks and
threatening her with the loss of her parent's love.
Consequently, the therapist contacted police and the social
services departments and began an investigation. The
investigation resulted in the arrest of Sandra Ann Craig
(Pershkov 935 & G. Fields 285).
Circuit Court Decision
The trial was first handled in the Circuit Court of Howard
County by Justice Raymond J. Kane Jr. On the state's motion,
the trial court allowed Brooke to testify outside Craig's
presence via closed-circuit television, pursuant to Maryland
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Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code section 9-102. Brooke
testified in the judge's chambers before a closed-circuit camera,
which transmitted her testimony to the jury in the courtroom.
Defense counsel fully questioned and cross-examined the child
and Ms. Craig was in constant contact with her lawyer by the
use of a telephone. After twelve days of trial, the jury
convicted Ms. Craig on all counts (Craig 784).
Maryland Court of Special Appeals Decision
Sandra Ann Craig appealed to the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland. This court lead by Justices Wilner, Karawacki
and Wenner held that:
the testimony of [the] victim via closed circuit
television did not violate the defendants right to
confrontation; face-to-face meeting in court between
witness and defendant was not absolutely necessary;
and [the] testimony of a child therapist was sufficient
to demonstrate that [the] child's presence in [the]
courtroom would be too traumatic. (784)
The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the
appellant to pay all costs.
.
In their written decision, the court quoted extens1vely
from the U.S. Supreme Court decision Coy v. Iowa. Coy was
charged with having assaulted two thirteen-year-old girls as they
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Ultimately, the investigation into Ms. Craig and the activities at her
school extended beyond what allegedly occurred to Brooke Etze. Thirteen
separate indictments were returned against Sandra Ann Craig. Her son, Jamal
Craig, was also charged in two indictments. Trial in this case, however,
proceeded only upon the one indictment of Ms. Craig involving Brooke Etze
(G. Fields 285).

This statue states that, in a case of child abuse, the court "may order
that the testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown
in the courtroom by means of closed circuit television if (1) the testimony is
taken during the proceeding; and (2) the judge determines that testimony by the
child victim in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional
distress such that the child could not communicate" (B. Fields 167 & Francis
827).
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slept in a tent in their backyard. The man who attacked them
:vas w.earing a stocki~g over his head and he shined a flashlight
m thetr eyes, so the gtrls were unable to identify their attacker.
Although no inquiry was made as to whether the victims would
be able to present their testimony in Coy's presence, and the
judge made no finding that they would be unable to do so
during the trial a recent Iowa statue was enacted which '
permitted a semi-opaque screen to be placed in the courtroom
between Coy and the witness stand. This screen was lit so that
Coy could dimly see the girls, but they could not see him
(Cusick 967 and Francis 827).
The Supreme Court ruled that this arrangement was
unconstitutional because it violated Coy's right to
confrontation. The Court argued confrontation was more than
mere cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation was the
most preferable method to uphold the sixth amendment.
However, the Coy decision did not make face-to-face
confrontation an absolute right. Justice O'Conner wrote
"[confro.ntation is] not absolute but rather may give way in an
appropnate case to other competing interests so as to permit
the use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a child
wit~ess from. the trauma o~ courtroom testimony" (Craig 784).
In hght of t~1s argumentation, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals dee1ded that the competing state interest in this case
was the w~ll-being of abused children. Therefore, Maryland
found thetr procedure to protect child witnesses fair and an
exception to the confrontation rule.
Maryland Court of Appeals Decision
Craig appealed the decision of the Special Appeals Court to
~he ~aryland Court of Appeals. The case was argued before
JUStices Murphy, Eldredge, Cole, Rodowsky, McAuliffe, Adkins
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and Blackwell. The Appeals Court reversed the previous
decision and remanded the case to the Howard County Circuit
Court (Craig 1120).
Again, this court quoted from Coy v. Iowa, but interpreted
the decision differently. The justices argued the language of the
Coy decision, "forcefully suggests that there is no exception to
the right of a criminal defendant to confront, face-to-face, a
witness who testifies against him" (1120).
Additionally, this Court decided that a State's interest in
protecting child witnesses was not compelling enough to
support the use of closed-circuit television. The Appeals Court
also ruled that the 9-102 code could not be invoked, "unless the
child witness initially is questioned in the defendant's presence,
and is found by the judge who presided at this procedure to be
unable to reasonably communicate because of serious emotional
distress produced by the presence of the defendant" (1120).
Brooke Etze was never questioned in front of Craig, and Judge
Kane had based his decision to use the closed-circuit procedure
solely on the testimony of a child psychologist (B. Fields 167).
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that in such
circumstances, Craig's right to confrontation had indeed been
denied.
Supreme Court Decision
Following this decision, the State of Maryland filed a
petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Certiorari was granted early in 1990 and the case was argued on
April 18th of the same year. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., the Attorney
General of Maryland, argued the case for the petitioner.
William H. Murphy argued the case for Craig (Maryland 836).
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee criminal defendants
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an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with the witness
against them at trial; Maryland's interest in protecting child
witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is
sufficiently important to justify the use of its special procedure
(provided the State makes an adequate showing of necessity in
the individual case); and the Court of Appeals erred in that
there are, at this time, no requisite requirements to enact the
procedure, only a case-specific necessary finding is required
(836).

Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and Kennedy
joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.
Justice O'Connor begins her opinion conceding that the
Court had previously upheld that "the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses
appearing before the trier of fact" (836). However, she argues
that the Court's previous decisions only show a mere
preference for a face-to-face meeting. The right to
confrontation was never absolute. Justice O'Connor continues
arguing that if the right to confrontation were absolute, hearsay
would not be allowed in court, but obvious exceptions exist (B.
Fields 167). Likewise, exceptions to face-to-face confrontation
must exist if a State finds a necessity to further a compelling
Interest.
The primary object of the Confrontation Clause, it is
argued, is to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits from
being used against a person in lieu of personal examination and
cross-examination of a witness. Therefore, Justice O'Connor
believes that as long as the elements of physical presence, oath,

cross-examination and observation of witness' demeanor are
maintained, the sixth amendment has not been violated.
Maryland's procedure preserves all of t.he ele~ents of
confrontation that Justice O'Connor fmds so Important. The
child witness must be competent to testify and must testify
under oath· the defendant retains full opportunity for
contempor~neous cross-examination; and the judge, jury and
defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the
demeanor of the witness as he or she testifies. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the .use .of one-way closed-circui:
television procedures do not Impmge upon the truth-seekmg or
symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause where
necessary to further an important state inte~est. The Court also
concluded that a State's interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of children vi,cti~s is sufficie?t in
many cases to outweigh the defendant s nght to see his accuser
face-to-face (Maryland 836).

Minority Opinion
.
.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Scaha for~efully ar~es".
the defendant's right to be confronted by the Witn.ess at tnal ~s
not a mere preference reflected by the Confrontation Clause; It
is a constitutional right unqualified and guaranteed" (~36). 3
Scalia believes that the sixth amendment cannot be misread.
"To confront," he argues, "plainly means to encounter face-toface whatever else it may mean in addition" (836). The only
exc~ptions to the confrontation cla~se in.volve cases v.:here the
declarant is unavailable. However, m this case, the witness was
clearly available to testify and therefore, no exception should
The amendment reads, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the witness against him" (497 U.S. 836).
3
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apply. The State's real purpose behind this code and their real
interest, Scalia argues, is not to protect children, but only to get
~ore convic~ions. Scalia states, "that is not an unworthy
mterest, but It should not be dressed up as a humanitarian one"
(836).
Discussion
. Although the Supreme Court held that the necessity of
usmg the closed-circuit television procedure must be determined
on a case-specific basis, the decision is still a broad one. Some
argue the excep.tion ~~s broader then necessary (B. Fields 167).
I~ f~ct, after this declSlon, twenty-four states enacted policies
s1m1lar to that of Maryland (Cusick 967).
. Ano.th.er resu~t of thi~ case is ~hat videotaped testimony of
chil~ren IS mcreasmgly bemg admitted into court. Videotaped
testimony has many advantages compared to closed-circuit
television testimony. For example, by videotaping the
testimony, the state is able to minimize the number of times
chi~dren mu~t r:hearse their traumatic experiences. However,
agam, the ch1ld 1s technically available to testify, but not within
the courtroom. Many states are still battling with this issue (B.
Fields 167).
Additionally, with the Supreme Court's recognition of this
exceptio~ t~ the conf.rontat~on rule, the Court has opened the
door to similar cases mvolvmg the protection of vulnerable
w~tn~sses. As a result, many contradictions have developed
withm state laws. Some states protect child witnesses only until
t~ey are twelve, while other protect children up to the age of
eighteen. Some states have enacted similar laws to protect the
elderly. Violent crime and rape victims are now also frequently
protected by the law. Even balancing the budget could be

considered an important state interest (B. Fields 167 & Cusick
967).

Many of the critics of the Craig opinion argue that the
decision was mostly driven by public opinion. One author
remarked:
It is driven by public opinion rather than a
straightforward legal analysis of a constitutional right.
It appears that the Court sought to find an exception
to the sixth amendment Confrontation Clause that
would enable evidence to be proffered against sex
abuse defendants while protecting the alleged victims
from courtroom trauma. Yet, no such exception
existed and none could be extrapolated from current
law. (Cusick 967)
Justice Scalia holds this view himself, and remarks in the
dissenting opinion that the Court failed miserably to uphold a
constitutional right against the tide of prevailing current
opinion (Maryland 836).
Not only did the Craig decision deny the constitutional
right of confrontation, it can be argued that the Maryland
procedure forces defendants to make an unconstitutional .
choice. If a defendant chooses to represent themselves at tnal,
in cases of child abuse, the defendant forfeits all right to crossexamine the witnesses (according to the same statue).
Therefore, the accused must choose either between being
represented by counsel or confronting face-to-face the child
witness (King 75).
Finally, the use of the closed-circuit television procedure
dilutes the presumption of innocence. One reason why the
Coy decision was reversed was that placing the screen in front
of the defendant may suggest to the jury that the defendant is
guilty. The closed-circuit television system is not as obviously
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prejudicial, but the procedure still seems to single out the
defendant and carries some risk of presumption of guilt (75).
Conclusion
Ultimately, Maryland v. Craig was a landmark decision
because for the first time in over two-hundred years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence, a defendant was denied the right to
confront a witness who actually appeared and testified at trial
(75). Courts must be careful, then, to invoke the special
procedure for child abuse victims only upon an appropriate
showing of necessity. In the wake of current public opinion, it
is important that we remember the fundamental principle of
our justice system: innocent until proven guilty. Great care
must be taken to avoid denying the rights of the accused
individual because it is more popular to recognize the rights of
the victim.
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